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1 Introduction
In developed countries, education plays a key role against unemployment: the higher
educational levels, the lower risks of unemployment (Mincer, 1991). In developing countries,
this role is more questionable as unemployment risks can be quite higher among well-educated
job seekers because of the insufficient demand for college graduates (Tansel & Tas¸c¸i, 2010).
This excessive supply of graduates and the inefficiency of education system also raise concerns
of educational mismatches in developing countries. Two types of educational mismatches can
occur. First, overeducation, or vertical educational mismatch, refers to an excess of education,
beyond the level needed to perform a certain job (Hartog, 2000; McGuinness, 2006). Second,
horizontal mismatch also exists and implies that people’s occupations do not match their fields
of education (Sloane, 2003; Robst, 2007a,b). The issues of high unemployment risks or long
unemployment duration and the concerns of educational mismatches among high-educated per-
sons would discourage people from investing in their own human capital. As a result, this will
have a negative impact on society and hinder the capacity of developing economies to catch
up developed nations. Analysis of unemployment duration and educational mismatches among
graduates represents thus a critical research need for developing countries.
Surprisingly, little studies examine the link between unemployment duration and educa-
tional mismatches in the previous literature. From the theoretical perspective, some graduates
prefer to leave unemployment as fast as possible, even though the job requirements are mis-
matched to their education. First, according to the job search theory, because of labor market
frictions, particularly imperfect information, it takes time to find a suitable job (Jovanovic,
1979). Graduates who face a financial constraint must tend to accept a job quickly although
the job match quality is poor. Another reason can be found in the stepping stone hypothesis
(Sicherman & Galor, 1990): overeducation is an investment in work experience, which enhances
promotion opportunities. Hence, educational mismatches can decrease unemployment dura-
tion. However, according to McCormick (1990), accepting a mismatched job can be a stronger
negative signal to employers than unemployment. Thus, there are also graduates who prefer
to stay longer on unemployment to queue for a matched job. Nevertheless, these graduates
may still fail to find a better matched job if the skilled job opportunities are limited in the
labor market (Thurow, 1976 ; Sattinger, 1993). In that situation, educational mismatches can
be also associated with a long unemployment duration. The uncertainty exists, and this needs
empirical investigations.
Cuesta (2005) uses a simultaneous equations’ procedure and finds that there are un-
observed factors that increase unemployment duration and reduce the probability of being
overeducated in the first job for Spanish youths. Similarly, Pollmann-Schult & Bu¨chel (2005),
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who use a data from the West German, find that job-seekers with receipt of unemployment
benefits stay unemployed with the length of unemployment spell 40% longer than those with-
out unemployment benefits, but they face lower risks of exit to overeducated jobs by 74%.
Pollmann-Schult & Bu¨chel (2005) explains that the lack of unemployment benefits presses
some workers to quickly accept a poor matched job, resulting in shorter unemployment du-
ration, which is consistent with the job search theory (Jovanovic, 1979). Nevertheless, Rose
& Ordine (2010) also use competing risks models applied to a survey carried out by the Ita-
lian Institute for Vocational Training of Workers and demonstrate that overeducation is an
occurrence that follows long periods of unemployment. Barros, Guironnet, & Peypoch (2011)
find that overeducation reduces the probability to find a job by around 10% in France. More
importantly, in Taiwan, Lin & Hsu (2013) find that the overeducated graduates endure un-
employment period for a 79% longer than graduates in a matched job. They explain these
findings as the fact that overeducated workers may have lesser academic results, and in the
context of limited job opportunities, employers seem to pay a strong attention to the schooling
results rather than only the educational level attainment. Hence, they struggle to find a decent
job and also must be unemployed for a longer period, which is aligned with the views from
the job competition (Thurow, 1976) and assignment models (Sattinger, 1993). Thus, the link
between unemployment duration and educational mismatches has not been resolved. Further-
more, previous literature focuses solely on developed countries and overeducation, it is worth
to extend this research into developing countries and study educational mismatches in all their
forms (vertical and horizontal) and dimensions (a single or a double mismatch).
The objective of this article is thus to investigate the relation between unemployment
duration and educational mismatches among graduates in Cambodia from both theoretical
and empirical angles. First, the theoretical model uses the job matching model to explain
the mechanism that links unemployment duration and educational mismatches. Second, the
empirical analysis using the independent competing risks regression, makes it possible to test
the likelihood of the established theoretical model.
Cambodia offers indeed an interesting case to illustrate the contextual issues regarding
unemployment risks and educational mismatches among university graduates in developing
countries. For instance, the unemployment rate in Cambodia among university graduates was
7.7% against 2.7% of people with only secondary education in 2012 (NIS, 2012). Between 2000
and 2014, the number of higher education institutions (HEI) in Cambodia massively increased
from 14 to 105 (Un, 2015). This expansion raises questions about the quality of HEI because
73% of employers reported that university graduates did not have the right skills for the jobs
for which they were applying (World Bank, 2012, p.8). Furthermore, there are high mismatches
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between the skills demanded by employers and the skills produced by the HEI. Indeed, between
2009 and 2014, almost 50% of total students were being enrolled in management and related
fields, and only around 3% were pursuing engineering or mechanical degrees, while Cambodia
rather needs engineers who can fill construction and manufacturing jobs (D’Amico, 2010, p.7;
Madhur, 2014a, p.1). Without viable solutions for these problems, Cambodia’s economy could
be stuck in the middle income trap (Madhur, 2014b, p.3).
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 defines the theoretical model. Section 3
presents the database and descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes the methods and discusses
the results. Section 5 concludes.
3
2 Theoretical model framework
We propose to model individual search behaviors to identify the links between unemploy-
ment duration and educational mismatches, based on the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides job
search model in a steady state environment (Pissarides, 2000, Chapter 1, p.1-23). Our model
introduces the heterogeneity of jobs and supposes that educational mismatches are the result
of search and matching process of individuals and firms.
All persons are assumed to be first-time job seekers and are homogeneous in terms of
their human capital level (university graduates). Two types of jobs exist and are noted by j
(j = R or M). The first type matches the acquired education of unemployed graduates and
is represented by a letter R (for Right match), while the second job is mismatched to their
education and is represented by a letter M (for Mismatch). The right matched job is more
productive, hence it offers a higher wage, but more difficulty can occur to find that type of
job. On the contrary, the mismatched job offers a lower wage but is less difficult to find. As
a result, unemployed graduates face a trade-off. They might prefer to quit unemployment as
fast as possible, even though the job is mismatched. They also might prefer to wait for a
right matched job, yet if they cannot find one after a long period, they still possibly fall into
a mismatched job.
2.1 Value function of a vacant and a filled job
The firm opens a job vacancy and searches for employees. The job’s output is a constant:
yj > 0. Since the job of type R is more productive than M , hence yR > yM . When a job is
vacant, the firm loses in terms of its activity at a cost yjcv > 0 per unit time (cv is a coefficient
constant for the cost of a vacant job).
Let m(u, v) = unv1−n be the matching function that gives the number of jobs m formed
at any moment in time as a function of the number of unemployed workers u, and the num-
ber of vacant jobs v. All firms are small and the number of jobs is determined by a profit
maximization.
Let Vj and Jj the present-discounted value of a vacant job and a filled job, respectively,
r a discount rate, q(θ)1 the arrival rate of workers to a job, wj the wage paid to workers, and
δ an exogenous shock. Vj and Jj can be written as:
rVj = q(θ)(Jj − Vj)− yjcv (1)
rJj = yj − wj − δJj (2)
1q(θ) =
m
v
and θ =
v
u
represents the market tightness
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When the decision to create a vacant job is made, the firm must choose between the two
types of jobs. The condition for which a firm prefers the type R than M is: VR > VM . Using
the equations (1) and (2), we find that VR > VM only if:
2
yR > yM +
q(θ)(wR − wM )
q(θ)− cv(r + δ) (3)
2.2 Value function of unemployment and employment
During the job search, an unemployed graduate enjoys a return, noted b (e.g., unpaid
leisure activities or home production). We assume that b is a constant and independent of
market returns. An unemployed graduate also suffers a constant cost cs for searching a job.
This cost may include the time or the money spent on the job search.
Let U and W denote the present-discounted value of the expected income of being unem-
ployed and employed, respectively, θq(θ)3 the arrival rate of job offers, and z = b− cs. Hence,
U can be defined as:
rU = z + θq(θ)(W − U) (4)
We assume that α is the fraction of type R and (1− α) is the fraction of type M (with
0 < α <
1
2
). A graduate’s expected wage to earn we equals thus αwR+(1−α)wM , with wj the
expected wage associated to each type of job. He may lose his job and becomes unemployed
at the exogenous rate δ. Therefore, W can be defined as:
rW = αwR + (1− α)wM + δ(U −W ) (5)
Using the equations (4) and (5), we can find the reservation wage of an unemployed
graduate, expressed by:4
w∗ = z +
θq(θ)α
r + δ + θq(θ)
H(wR) +
θq(θ)(1− α)
r + δ + θq(θ)
H(wM ) (6)
H(wR) and H(wM ) represent respectively the distribution of wage offered from each type of
jobs, R and M , which is greater than or at least equals z.
2See Appendix: A
3θq(θ) =
m
u
=
v
u
m
v
4See Appendix: B
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Consider λR = θq(θ)α the arrival rate of job offers from the type R, λM = θq(θ)(1− α)
the arrival rate of job offers from the type M , and [1− Fj(w∗)] the probability that the wage
offered from each type of job is higher than or equals the reservation wage, we can write the
exit rate from unemployment (φj) to each type of job as below:
φR = λR[1− FR(w∗)] (7)
φM = λM [1− FM (w∗)] (8)
From the equations (7) and (8), the exit rate from unemployment is defined as a product of
the arrival rate of job offers and the probability that the wage offered is higher than or equals
the reservation wage. The arrival rate of job offers from the type R is lower than from the
type M because it is more difficult to find the type R. Nevertheless, the probability that the
wage offered from R exceeds or equals the reservation wage is higher than from M because the
type R is more productive and associated with higher wages. In what case, φR can be higher
as well as lower than φM . Our model thus leads to a theoretical indecision. Table 1 provides
a comparative static exercise of φR and φM according to two different hypotheses.
Table 1: Association of unemployment duration and educational mismatches
Hypotheses Exit rate Interpretations
λM
λR
>
1− FR(w∗)
1− FM (w∗)
φM > φR Shorter unemployment duration is associated with higher
educational mismatches.
λM
λR
<
1− FR(w∗)
1− FM (w∗)
φM < φR Longer unemployment duration is associated with higher
educational mismatches.
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3 Data and descriptive statistics
Since our model does not lead to an analytic solution, we propose to overcome the
uncertainty by estimating φR and φM with a reduced-form model from a survey of graduates
in Cambodia.
The University Research Center in Economics and Management at the Royal Univer-
sity of Law and Economics in Cambodia conducted the survey that informs this research by
phone between January and April 2011, among Cambodian graduates who had received their
bachelor’s degrees in 2008, around 33 months after their graduation. The 4,025 graduates5 are
randomly selected and representative of nineteen HEI in Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambo-
dia. The current study excludes self-employed people from the initial data set, because there is
no detailed information available to evaluate if they require a university degree for their busi-
ness or not. Observations that offered no information about the occupations or the duration
of unemployment also were dropped. The final sample thus contains 3,211 graduates. Note
that our final sample still represents the study population.6
This survey records the total unemployment spell that graduates had faced since their
graduation and if some graduates were still unemployed at the moment of interview that we can
code these observations as censored data. The survey also informs us several observed gradu-
ates’ characteristics such as genre, age, marital status, parents’ educational levels, birthplace,
types of university, internship, and graduates’ preferences for different job characteristics. Fur-
thermore, the sample provides information about graduates’ fields of study and occupations
allowing us thus to calculate the incidence of educational mismatches.
To measure the mismatch incidences, the job analysis (JA) method, which offers an
objective measure, is employed. The International Standard Classification of Occupations Code
(ISCO-08) and the International Standard Classification of Education published (ISCED-97)
conform with this objective measure to help define who is overeducated or not. Graduates
working in jobs that require skill levels of 3 or 4, which correspond to the occupational levels
1 (managers), 2 (professionals), and 3 (technicians or associate professionals), are classified
as matched workers. Other occupational levels that demand skill levels lower than 3 signal
graduates who are overeducated. 7
The data also include information about the specialty of each bachelor’s degree acquired
from the different universities, which supports an objective determination of the presence of a
5The average response rate was 80%, and the majority of no responses were due to the fact that graduates
had changed their phone numbers, making interviewers impossible to contact them.
6By comparing the means and standard deviations of all variables used in our analysis before and after the
eliminations of those observations, we do not remark any important gaps to consider.
7Two tables specify the process for matching the occupational class to the educational level required are in
the Appendix: C.
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horizontal mismatch. By reviewing the study program and job prospect of each specialty offered
by each university, the author compares these descriptions with each individual occupation to
discern if each graduate’s job corresponds with his or her field of study.8
Based on these objective measures, 35% and 33% of graduates are overeducated and hori-
zontally mismatched, respectively. Some graduates can also be double mismatched, it is thus
interesting to construct a variable that represents the overall level of mismatch. This variable
indicates that 32% and 18% of graduates are single (either vertical or horizontal mismatches
only) and double mismatched, respectively. The incidence of educational mismatches for each
category is provided in Table 2 with the relation to unemployment duration.
Table 2: Unemployment duration and educational mismatches
Unemployment duration (Days)
Variables Percentage Mean Std. Dev.
Overeducation 35.43% 42.33 129.74
Horizontal mismatch 33.25% 38.23 119.72
Overeducation only 16.96% 38.41 110.77
Horizontal mismatch only 14.78% 28.60 76.36
No mismatch 49.79% 34.67 102.33
Single mismatch 31.74% 33.84 96.37
Double mismatch 18.47% 45.93 145.00
Observations 3,1199 36.49 109.80
From Table 2, graduates without any mismatches and graduates with a single mismatch have
experienced a similar unemployment duration. Nevertheless, graduates with a double mismatch
is observed to have experienced the longest unemployment duration on average. This may
indicate that there are graduates who stay longer on unemployment to search for a better
job match quality but cannot find. These observed statistics may support the second result in
Table 1 of our theoretical model (φM < φR) that a longer unemployment duration is associated
with higher educational mismatches.
Besides educational mismatches, there exists other observable factors that can also influ-
ence the unemployment duration such as genre, age, marital status, fields of study, internship,
parents’ educational levels, job networks, job characteristic preferences, etc. Table 3 provides
a description of unemployment duration by graduates’ attributes.
8The matching table can be found in the Appendix: D.
9There are 92 censored observations that we cannot determine if they work in a mismatched job or not
because they still stay unemployed.
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Table 3: Unemployment duration by graduates’ attributes
TOTAL
VARIABLES Mean Std. dev. Unemployment
Duration (Days)
Dependent variable
Unemployment Duration (Days) 53.2 155.5
Male 0.64 0.48 54.01
Age at the end of the study 21.85 3.98 49.13
Square of age at the end of the study 493.08 224.78 49.13
Married 0.25 0.43 38.63
Engineering Sciences 0.05 0.21 80.50
Law-Eco-Management 0.49 0.50 63.93
Social Sciences Khmer 0.06 0.24 34.04
Social Sciences English 0.15 0.36 26.00
Scholarship status 0.02 0.14 27.76
Double university degree 0.57 0.49 53.48
Internet training 0.15 0.36 34.46
Study in a private university 0.55 0.50 54.98
Internship during study 0.51 0.50 52.07
Birthplace in Phnom Penh 0.51 0.50 45.84
High level education of parents 0.34 0.47 43.69
Informal job networks 0.36 0.48 33.43
Expect for a good career development 0.77 0.42 48.48
Expect for a good salary 0.84 0.36 54.54
Expect for a job security or stability 0.65 0.48 41.82
Expect for a job with leisure 0.81 0.39 51.13
Expect for an enough time with family 0.80 0.40 50.47
Observations 3,211
From Table 3, we observe that unemployment duration can be influenced by several variables,
yet the effects might be different depending on whether graduates are mismatched or not. It
is thus necessary to conduct an econometric analysis to identify the impact of educational
mismatches and the effects of graduates’ attributes on their unemployment duration.
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4 Methods and results
The descriptive analysis shows that educational mismatches and graduates’ attributes
can affect unemployment duration. To identify these impacts, two econometric methods are
proposed. First, a single risk regression10 does not take into account different types of job.
Second, an independent competing risk regression considers different job types. Four models
are introduced: First, we divide jobs into the matched and mismatched jobs (all forms of
mismatches); second, we differentiate between the transition to overeducation and to horizontal
mismatch; third, we focus on the transition to overeducation only and horizontal mismatch
only; and fourth, we analyze the overall level of mismatches (no mismatch, single mismatch
and double mismatch).
In time-to-event data, the underlying time scale is generally supposed to be continuous
and indexed by t ∈ R. With the presence of competing risks, graduates are assumed to enter
unemployment at time t = 0 and leave this unemployment spell either to enter one among N
types of jobs. Graduates are treated as censored observations if they are still unemployed at
the time of survey. Let T ∗k be the latent duration associated with a transition from unemploy-
ment to work in a job of type k (k = 1, 2, ..., N). We assume that the latent durations are
independently distributed conditionally on the observable covariates X.
(T ∗j q T ∗k ) | X, ∀ j 6= k, j, k = 1, 2, ..., N (9)
The rate of transition from unemployment to work in a job of type k at a moment in time is
supposed to have the following form with a proportional hazard specification:
h¯k(t|X) = h¯k,0(t)exp(Xβk) (10)
where h¯k(t) is the subdistribution hazard or the instantaneous rate of transition from unem-
ployment to work in a job of type k, h¯k,0 is the baseline hazard of the subdistribution and left
unspecified, X are observable covariates, and βk are unknown coefficients. Table 4 presents
the results.
10The test of Schoenfeld residuals proves that the hazards are proportional; therefore, the Cox duration model
fits our data well. However, this model does not consider the possible existence of unobserved heterogeneity.
We propose thus a Weibull regression that takes into account the unobserved heterogeneity but cannot allow
for different competing risks. We observe that there is a presence of unobserved heterogeneity, yet we are not
able to tell if this presence is due to the fact that we assume the hazards are not proportional, but it is false,
or that we assume there are no competing risks, but it is also false.
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Table 4: Results
Weibull regression Competing risks regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
VARIABLES All issues Match Mismatch Overeducation Horiz. Mis. Over. Only Horiz. Mis. Only No Mis. Single Mis. Double Mis.
Male -0.093 0.289*** -0.261*** -0.398*** -0.120** -0.447*** 0.162 0.289*** -0.190*** -0.303***
(0.067) (0.049) (0.042) (0.052) (0.058) (0.081) (0.101) (0.049) (0.058) (0.080)
Age at the end of the study 0.084** 0.045* -0.022 -0.104** 0.021 -0.066 0.166 0.045* 0.032 -0.090
(0.039) (0.027) (0.040) (0.046) (0.050) (0.082) (0.106) (0.027) (0.061) (0.060)
Square of age at the end of the study -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0011 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0029 -0.0004 -0.0009 0.0010
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0010)
Married 0.179** 0.133** -0.085 -0.074 0.028 -0.350*** -0.128 0.133** -0.218*** 0.144
(0.079) (0.052) (0.053) (0.066) (0.068) (0.111) (0.112) (0.052) (0.075) (0.096)
Engineering Sciences -0.558*** 0.454*** -1.019*** -1.771*** -0.905*** -2.127** -0.419* 0.454*** -0.620*** -1.679***
(0.162) (0.075) (0.188) (0.378) (0.192) (1.012) (0.233) (0.075) (0.221) (0.410)
Law - Economics - Management -0.124 -0.144*** 0.105** 0.549*** -0.424*** 1.453*** -0.918*** -0.144*** 0.200*** -0.051
(0.080) (0.053) (0.052) (0.073) (0.065) (0.158) (0.115) (0.053) (0.075) (0.093)
Social Sciences Khmer 0.293** 0.216*** -0.214* -0.246 -0.128 -0.987* -0.132 0.216*** -0.274 -0.089
(0.131) (0.080) (0.114) (0.166) (0.120) (0.518) (0.179) (0.080) (0.168) (0.181)
Social Sciences English 0.347*** -0.055 0.103 0.151 -0.137 0.991*** 0.045 -0.055 0.333*** -0.341**
(0.099) (0.068) (0.071) (0.103) (0.086) (0.191) (0.124) (0.068) (0.095) (0.143)
Scholarship status 0.495** 0.020 0.031 -0.261 0.001 0.083 0.433* 0.020 0.271 -0.644
(0.209) (0.138) (0.150) (0.227) (0.207) (0.300) (0.260) (0.138) (0.179) (0.412)
Double university degree 0.016 0.080* -0.070 -0.090 -0.165*** 0.119 -0.038 0.080* 0.060 -0.260***
(0.070) (0.046) (0.045) (0.057) (0.061) (0.091) (0.099) (0.046) (0.064) (0.087)
Internet training 0.322*** 0.047 0.077 0.104 -0.014 0.175 -0.022 0.047 0.105 -0.010
(0.087) (0.060) (0.059) (0.073) (0.085) (0.112) (0.135) (0.060) (0.080) (0.119)
Study in a private university -0.005 -0.032 0.018 -0.077 0.174*** -0.277*** 0.231** -0.032 -0.049 0.107
(0.067) (0.045) (0.045) (0.056) (0.061) (0.089) (0.098) (0.045) (0.062) (0.088)
Internship during study 0.033 0.072* -0.047 0.015 0.014 -0.061 -0.124 0.072* -0.146** 0.124
(0.064) (0.043) (0.042) (0.052) (0.056) (0.085) (0.092) (0.043) (0.059) (0.078)
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Table 4: Results-continued
Weibull regression Competing risks regression
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
VARIABLES All issues Match Mismatch Overeducation Horiz. Mis. Over. Only Horiz. Mis. Only No Mis. Single Mis. Double Mis.
Birthplace in Phnom Penh 0.092 -0.063 0.078* 0.065 0.116** -0.016 0.077 -0.063 0.036 0.134*
(0.064) (0.042) (0.042) (0.052) (0.056) (0.083) (0.090) (0.042) (0.058) (0.079)
High level education of parents 0.148** 0.172*** -0.153*** -0.165*** -0.194*** -0.046 -0.094 0.172*** -0.073 -0.266***
(0.066) 0.043 (0.046) (0.057) (0.061) (0.087) (0.097) (0.043) (0.062) (0.088)
Informal job networks 0.374*** -0.114** 0.197*** 0.254*** 0.119** 0.268*** -0.016 -0.114** 0.157** 0.202**
(0.068) (0.046) (0.045) (0.057) (0.060) (0.091) (0.099) (0.046) (0.064) (0.085)
Expect for a good career development 0.278*** 0.053 -0.031 -0.040 -0.112 0.096 -0.036 0.053 0.055 -0.174*
(0.087) (0.054) (0.053) (0.067) (0.072) (0.112) (0.118) (0.054) (0.077) (0.102)
Expect for a good salary -0.275*** -0.122** 0.067 0.212** -0.032 0.278** -0.235** -0.122** 0.016 0.152
(0.091) (0.058) (0.062) (0.084) (0.079) (0.137) (0.118) (0.058) (0.085) (0.122)
Expect for a job security or stability 0.365*** 0.172*** -0.114** -0.171*** -0.033 -0.217** 0.051 0.172*** -0.112* -0.101
(0.076) (0.050) (0.048) (0.060) (0.065) (0.094) (0.106) (0.050) (0.066) (0.091)
Expect for a job with leisure 0.110 0.365*** -0.379*** -0.326* -0.401** -0.321 -0.507* 0.365*** -0.367** -0.308
(0.208) (0.110) (0.129) (0.166) (0.184) (0.273) (0.262) (0.110) (0.185) (0.270)
Expect for an enough time with family 0.163 -0.285*** 0.315** 0.338** 0.355* 0.169 0.215 -0.285*** 0.192 0.459*
(0.203) (0.103) (0.129) (0.165) (0.183) (0.267) (0.259) (0.103) (0.183) (0.268)
Constant -2.839***
(0.566)
ln p -0.443***
(0.010)
ln θ 0.609***
(0.024)
No. of Occurrence 3,119 1,566 1,533 1,105 1,037 529 461 1,566 990 576
No. of Censored observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
No. of Competing observations 0 1,553 1,566 2,014 2,082 2,590 2,658 1,553 2,129 2,543
No. of Total observations 3,211 3,211 3,211 3,211 3,211 3,211 3,211 3,211 3,211 3,211
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets.
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The competing risks duration models allows us to predict the effect of educational mis-
matches on unemployment hazards (see Table 5).
Table 5: Educational mismatches and unemployment hazards
Non parametric model: Competing risks duration models:
Educational mismatches Estimates of unemployment hazards Predicted unemployment hazards
Match 0.813 0.121
Mismatch 0.815 0.406
Overeducation 0.815 0.246
Horizontal mismatch 0.814 0.311
Overeducation only 0.815 0.214
Horizontal mismatch only 0.813 0.182
No mismatch 0.813 0.121
Single mismatch 0.814 0.215
Double mismatch 0.815 0.540
From the non parametric Kaplan Meier estimates, it seems that there is no relation between
unemployment hazards and educational mismatches. Nevertheless, with the prediction from
the competing risks duration models, we clearly see that unemployment hazards increase with
educational mismatches. In other words, graduates who are educational mismatched, stay
longer on unemployment duration; hence a double penalty. This result supports the second
hypothesis of our theoretical model (φM < φR) where graduates prefer to queue for a right
match job but fail to find, probably due to the lack of demand for college graduates in Cambo-
dia, and the inefficiency of education system that fails to develop students’ professional skills
required by the labor market.
Our results also show that the determinants of unemployment duration are different
according to the issues. For example, in the Model 1 of Table 4, genre has no influence on the
transition from school to work. Nevertheless, when we distinguish the types of job, we can see
that being a male has clearly an advantage in finding a job that matches his level and field
of education, and also reduces the risk of being mismatched as also noted by McGoldrick &
Robst (1996). These two effects are compensated each other in the Model 1. The fact that
women have lower opportunities than their male counterparts in terms of finding a matched
job, maybe because of the tendency of women to rather select management and related majors
that offer poorer employment prospects in Cambodia. Based on the results found by Dolton
& Vignoles (2000) and Green & McIntosh (2007), graduates in more scientific majors such
as engineering are less prone to be mismatched. Indeed, despite graduates in engineering
sciences stay longer on unemployment due to the world economic crisis in 2008 that hits the
construction sector in Cambodia in 2008 and 2009, this degree does have a strong impact
on finding a well-suited job. Graduating from a private university appears to face a higher
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incidence of horizontal mismatch, but surprisingly, it reduces the risk of being overeducated
when we consider the exit rate among graduates to overeducation only. This might suggest
that the educational quality of some private universities, especially the big ones, is not really
worse than public universities. Among graduates who have completed an internship might
profit this first professional experience as a chance to get a proper job after their study. On the
contrary, using an informal job network increases the risk of being mismatched as also found
by Meliciani & Radicchia (2014), though it might help to find a job faster. Parents’ education
plays a significant role to assist their children getting a job faster and increases the graduates’
chance of finding a right matched job. As Hansen & Mastekaasa (2006), Torche (2011), and
Capsada-Munsech (2015) suggest, educated parents are likely better informed and share more
knowledge with their children.
Regarding the preferences of graduates, we find that graduates who expect for a good career
development face lower risks of exit to a double mismatched job. Indeed, graduates might
believe that accepting a job that does not match both their educational field and level is a
strong negative signal to employers as well as being unemployed, and this would limit their
future career development, similar to what McCormick (1990) and Pissarides (1992) suggest.
Graduates who expect for a job security or stability rather transit to a right matched job and
they are less overeducated. Indeed, following the career mobility theory (Sicherman & Galor,
1990), a mismatched job is likely unstable because most people who accept that type of job
might consider it as just a temporary job to move up later. Graduates who hope for a job
with leisure also tend to reject the mismatched jobs. This indicates that working in a job that
does not fit their competences can be more boring since their skills acquired at schools cannot
be well-used, and they have to learn new skills. Expectations for a high salary does prolong
the unemployment duration. This preference also increases the risk of being overeducated but
decreases the risk of horizontal mismatches. Graduates might consider that accepting a job
that is vertically mismatched is not a serious problem since after years, they can challenge to
be promoted to a higher position level. On the other hand, accepting a job that is horizontally
mismatched can be a bad decision because the skills that they learned at school related to
a particular field might not be re-utilized at all in the future, which can strongly limit their
career perspective or their future salary increase. Finally, graduates who valorize their time
for family tend to be more double mismatched. Perhaps, their family tasks constraint them to
have a limit of available occupational choices.
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5 Conclusion
This article investigates whether there exists a relation between unemployment duration
and educational mismatches among university graduates in Cambodia. We use a survey, driven
in nineteen Cambodian higher education institutions (HEI), that provides precise insights into
the jobs obtained by university graduates and supports measures of the potential mismatches
between educational endowments and job characteristics. The survey also informs us the total
unemployment duration that graduates had faced since their graduation and several observed
graduates’ attributes. Our paper contributes to literature on two main points. First, given the
specific contextual issues in developing countries, we analyze the case of Cambodia, where the
HEI have been expanding widely and rapidly, but with an increasing trend of unemployment
risks and educational mismatches among university graduates. Second, our paper analyzes from
both theoretical and empirical angles. In the theoretical part, we use the job matching model
to explain the mechanism that links unemployment duration and educational mismatches. In
the empirical analysis, we use the independent competing risks duration model by proposing
several different configurations that capture educational mismatches in all their dimensions,
especially the Model 5 that allows us finding that unemployment duration increases with the
level of educational mismatches.
Therefore, the Cambodian education system needs to improve its quality to respond to
the labor market’s demands. This requires a close working relationship between Ministries, pri-
vate sector and HEI. The HEI need to recruit more highly qualified teachers and update their
teaching methodologies to improve the students’ professional skills, including cross-cutting
knowledge like computer and English skills. Internships should be set as a compulsory re-
quirement by the HEI because students can acquire the practical experiences and create their
professional networks. Evaluations of different universities’ performance in terms of students’
employability must be developed to help families make more informed educational choices
based on the available opportunities in the labor market, and the reporting evaluations would
also provide valuable signals to the government for consideration in their education policies.
Financial incentives might be an effective way to guide students toward the training courses
that the companies need. Finally, programs focused specially on young female students should
be established, to overcome the gender differences in the Cambodian labor market.
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Appendices
A Appendix: A
From the equations (1) and (2), we can write:
Vj =
q(θ)Jj − yjc
r + q(θ)
(11)
Jj =
yj − wj
r + δ
(12)
Replacing (12) into (11), we get:
Vj =
q(θ)(yj − wj)− yjcv(r + δ)
[r + q(θ)](r + δ)
(13)
From the equation (13), we can write VR and VM ; then the condition for VR > VM implies
that:
q(θ)(yR − wR)− yRcv(r + δ) > q(θ)(yM − wM )− yMcv(r + δ) (14)
Solving this equation, we will get the equation (3).
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B Appendix: B
From the equations (4) and (5), we can write:
U =
z + θq(θ)W
r + θq(θ)
(15)
W =
αwR + (1− α)wM + δU
r + δ
(16)
Replacing (16) into (15), we will get:
rU =
(r + δ)z + θq(θ)[αwR + (1− α)wM ]
r + δ + θq(θ)
(17)
Next, replacing (15) into (16), we will get:
rW =
δz + [r + θq(θ)][αwR + (1− α)wM ]
r + δ + θq(θ)
(18)
From (17) and (18), we can write:
W − U = α(wR − z) + (1− α)(wM − z)
r + δ + θq(θ)
(19)
Since rU is the reservation wage w∗ that an unemployed worker requires to give up his job
search, we can re-write the equation (4) as:
w∗ = z + θq(θ)(W − U) (20)
Hence the reservation wage can be determined with an integration of W − U from (19):
w∗ = z + θq(θ)
∫ +∞
z
(W − U)dF (w) (21)
w∗ = z +
θq(θ)α
r + δ + θq(θ)
∫ ∞
z
(wR − z)dF (wR) + θq(θ)(1− α)
r + δ + θq(θ)
∫ ∞
z
(wM − z)dF (wM ) (22)
Imposing that H(wR) =
∫∞
z
(wR− z)dF (wR); and H(wM ) =
∫∞
z
(wM − z)dF (wM ), we can get
the equation (6).
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C Appendix: C
Table 6: Correspondence between occupational class and educational level
ISCO-08 occupational class ILO skill level ISCED-97 educational level
1. Manager 3 + 4 6, 5a and 5b
2. Professionals 4 6 and 5a
3. Technicians 3 5b
4. Clerks 2 4, 3 and 2
5. Service and sales 2 4, 3 and 2
6. Skilled agricultural 2 4, 3 and 2
7. Craft and related 2 4, 3 and 2
8. Plant and machine operators 2 4, 3 and 2
9. Elementary occupations 1 1
Source: ISCO-08, volume I
Table 7: Description of educational level required for each skill level
Skill level Educational level Description of educational level
4 6 Second stage of tertiary education (ad-
vanced research qualification)
5a First stage of tertiary education, 1st degree
(medium duration)
3 5b First stage of tertiary education (short or
medium duration)
2 4 Post-secondary, non-tertiary education
3 Upper secondary level of education
2 Lower secondary level of education
1 1 Primary level of education
Source: ISCO-08, volume I
Notes: One limit of using this measure to estimate the rate of overeducation is that the same
job title may not mean that workers are performing the same tasks, and thus workers can be
required to possess different educational levels. Nevertheless, other measures of overeducation
also possess other drawbacks (please see the literature review of McGuinness (2006) and Sala
et al. (2011) for a further discussion on this matter). Additionally, the use of this measure is
also constrained by the data availability. For instance, previous researches on this issue in de-
veloping countries, including Cambodia, conducted by the International Labour Organization
and Asian Development Bank also employ this same method by assigning the ISCO with 1
digit level to the ISCED (e.g., Sparreboom & Staneva, 2014 ; ILO and ADB, 2015).
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D Appendix: D
Table 8: Field of education and Matching jobs
Field of education Matching jobs (ISCO-08 3-digit codes)
Economics and Management 134, 143, 231, 232, 241, 242, 243, 262, 263, 264, 331,
332, 333, 334, 411, 412, 413, 421, 431, 432, 522
Engineering and Architecture 132, 214, 215, 216, 231, 232, 233, 311, 312, 313, 315,
515
Social sciences in English language 111, 112, 121, 122, 133, 134, 141, 143, 216, 231, 232,
233, 241, 242, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 334, 341, 343,
351, 352, 411, 412, 413, 511, 521, 522, 524
Sociology, Humanities and Arts 112, 216, 231, 232, 233, 234, 262, 263, 264, 265, 341,
511
Sciences 211, 212, 231, 232, 233, 311, 331, 421, 431
Information and Computer Technologies 112, 121, 133, 134, 231, 232, 233, 251, 252, 351, 352,
524
Tourism and Hospitality 112, 122, 134, 141, 231, 232, 243, 264, 341, 343, 441,
511
Law and Public Affairs 111, 121, 231, 232, 242, 261, 262, 263, 264, 334, 335,
341
Table source: Author’s estimation by reviewing the job prospects described for each specialty in each university,
then comparing with individual occupation.
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